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Fragmentation and limited accessibility of charging
infrastructure impede the adoption of electric vehicles.
To improve the availability of charging infrastructure
independent of providers, eRoaming offers a promising
solution. Yet, current eRoaming systems are typically
centralized, which raises concerns of market power
concentration. While the use of blockchain technology
can obviate such concerns, it comes with significant
privacy challenges. To address these challenges, we
explore a combination of blockchain with self-sovereign
identity. Specifically, we apply a design science research
approach, which helps us to identify requirements,
derive a conceptual architecture, and deduce design
principles for decentralized eRoaming and beyond. We
find that blockchain may best leverage its benefits when
it takes a backseat as a public registry for legal entities.
Moreover, we find that the use of self-sovereign identities
could improve compliance with privacy regulations, but
they should not be overused.
1. Introduction
Electric vehicles (EVs) are indispensable for more
sustainable transportation [1]. Yet, the adoption of
EVs still falls short of expectations [2]. One reason
for this slow adoption is the limited availability and
accessibility of charging points [3]. Unlike current
fueling processes with regular petrol or diesel cars, EV
users cannot simply plug and charge their vehicles at any
charging point. Instead, charging points often require
provider-specific contracts as well as provider-specific
apps or RFID cards [4]. Consequently, EV users
typically need to sign multiple contracts and use several
apps or RFID cards to ensure access to a sufficient
number of charging points. The resulting inconvenience
may ultimately lead to a slower adoption of EVs [5, 6].
As a result, charging point providers have introduced
the concept of eRoaming, which grants users access to
charging points operated by various providers with a
single contract [4, 7]. Yet, eRoaming requires technical
interoperability, sophisticated identity management,
and simple clearing processes between providers [4].
Current eRoaming systems typically address these
requirements with centralized platform designs. That is,
multiple providers connect to one platform to share their
charging points [7–9]. Such eRoaming platforms are
typically operated by an electric mobility clearing house
(EMCH). However, centralized approaches are often
ill-received, as they pose privacy risks due to centralized
storage of data and might lead to concentration of
market power in favor of EMCHs [7, 8].
Consequently, various concepts for decentralized
eRoaming solutions have emerged [8, 10, 11]. These
concepts typically propose to use blockchain for
decentralized identity management [11, 12], and
automated token-based clearing and settlement [8,
11, 13, 14]. Yet, the exchange of user data with
blockchain often raises substantial privacy concerns [15,
16]. To mitigate privacy concerns of both centralized
and blockchain-based eRoaming solutions, an identity
management that stores personal information only with
the identity subject – the user – is required [11]. In





this context, the emerging construct of self-sovereign
identity (SSI) receives increasing attention. SSI
implementations often use blockchain as a decentralized
public key infrastructure (PKI) [17], which may
function as a foundation for identity management in
blockchain-based eRoaming solutions [11]. However,
when approaching blockchain-based SSI, a sensible use
of blockchain is required to prevent privacy issues that
result from storing identity information on-chain [16].
Hence, we ask:
RQ: How can a decentralized eRoaming system be
designed with blockchain and SSI?
We explore this research question using a Design
Science Research (DSR) approach [18]. The use of
DSR helps us to identify requirements for decentralized
eRoaming and to design a decentralized eRoaming
system with blockchain and SSI. We started with
a structured literature review (SLR) [19] to derive
design objectives and requirements for decentralized
eRoaming. Further investigation of current eRoaming
systems helped us to develop a conceptual architecture
for decentralized eRoaming. We qualitatively evaluated
this architecture in 13 expert interviews [20]. Based
on our emerging architecture, we deduced four
generalizable design principles [21]. These design
principles provide guidance for practitioners who
implement decentralized eRoaming and may serve as a
starting point for researchers to develop a design theory
for eRoaming and similar service systems.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. eRoaming
The current charging infrastructure for EVs is highly
fragmented [7, 22]. Unlike the refueling at established
gas stations, EV charging requires the interplay of two
main actors: the charge point operator (CPO) and the
electric mobility service provider (eMSP). While CPOs
maintain the charging points and manage the charging
process, eMSPs offer charging services to users [7, 23,
24]. By subscribing to an eMSP, users can access
all charging points within an eMSP’s network. At the
same time, they cannot access charging points outside
of the eMSP’s network. Consequently, users often enter
into multiple contracts with eMSPs to gain access to
a sufficient number of charging points [22]. However,
the need for multiple contracts creates barriers to EV
charging and is considered cumbersome [5].
To reduce such barriers and increase network
access for users, CPOs and eMSPs typically establish
business-to-business (B2B) eRoaming agreements that
allow for the provision of services on behalf of each
other [22]. In general, eRoaming requires four main
process steps: registration, authentication, charging, and
clearing [24]. Prior to the charging process, users must
conclude a contract with an eMSP. For registration,
eMSPs typically assign each user a unique identifier –
the electric mobility account identifier (EMAID) [24].
At the charging point, the user authenticates as a
subscribed user by transmitting its EMAID to the CPO
using an eMSP-specific RFID card or a mobile app. This
initiates the actual charging process. After completion
of the charging process, the charging point or the CPO’s
backend system creates a charge detail record (CDR)
that serves as the basis for clearing. Specifically, the
CDR includes a unique charging session identifier, the
charged amount of energy, the EMAID, and the resulting
payment [23–25]. The CPO forwards the CDR together
with a B2B bill to the eMSP, who bills the user and pays
the charged amount to the CPO.
The four process steps of eRoaming require a
reliable exchange of contract information to enable
seamless authentication and clearing between CPO and
eMSP, and eMSP and user [4, 24]. Currently, multiple
eRoaming systems and protocols exist with either a
centralized or decentralized design. Centralized designs
that connect multiple providers to one platform are
the predominant design [7, 24, 26]. These platforms
typically make use of proprietary protocols, such as
OCHP, OICP, or eMIP to facilitate authentication and
clearing [9]. However, centralization comes with
significant security, privacy, and scalability challenges,
and concerns regarding market monopolization [7–9].
In response to these challenges, decentralized
approaches which store data decentrally and grant equal
market access to all actors have gained traction [8,
9, 11]. For business-centric approaches, i.e. B2B
information exchange, OCPI provides an emerging
standardized messaging protocol for eRoaming [9].
More user-centric approaches try to map information
exchange with blockchain technology to e.g., facilitate
the clearing of charging events [8, 11, 14] or enable
decentralized identity management [11, 12]. While
blockchain-based approaches appear to be popular
in literature, they come with significant privacy
concerns [14]. First approaches also already exist
that suggest the use of blockchain-based SSI for
eRoaming [11]. Yet, proposed solutions anchor
digital identities on-chain, which may again cause
privacy-related issues and contradict data protection
regulations such as the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [27]. Such solutions also introduce
blockchain for clearing but fail to provide details
on the execution of payments on-chain, the required
type of blockchain, or the general acceptance of
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blockchain-based payments [11]. They also do not
provide a rigorous analysis of general requirements and
the role of blockchain for decentralized eRoaming. We,
therefore, aim to provide a more rigorous analysis by
conducting DSR with an architecture that combines
blockchain and SSI for decentralized eRoaming.
2.2. Blockchain Technology
A blockchain is a distributed transactional database
redundantly stored on the nodes of a peer-to-peer (P2P)
network [28,29]. Transactions are aggregated into larger
formations (blocks) and are chronologically linked
via cryptographic hashes, forming a tamper-resistant
chain of records [29]. The nodes reach agreement
about the state of the blockchain by following a
consensus protocol [29]. As each node stores
a copy of the blockchain, blockchains enable a
shared state of information without requiring a
central authority [30]. Dependent on the type
of blockchain, the rights of participants may differ
[28]. While public blockchains enable every user
to read and validate transactions, private blockchains
restrict access to certain participants. Permissioned
blockchains additionally restrict participation in the
consensus process. To manage transactions and access
rights, blockchains employ a decentralized PKI with
asymmetric encryption and digital signatures [15].
This built-in PKI of blockchain has encouraged the
development of decentralized certificate-based identity
solutions [17, 31]. These solutions have their roots
in identity management approaches that combine a
PKI with digital certificates to enable secure digital
authentication and proofs of permissions [32, 33].
Decentralized, certificate-based identity management
has been used to authenticate servers way before the
development of blockchain [33]. Yet, their lack of
a sophisticated revocation mechanism prevented broad
adoption on an end-user level [33,34]. Blockchain may,
in this case, serve as a technical enabler of decentralized
certificate-based identity solutions such as SSI [17, 31].
2.3. Self-Sovereign Identity
SSI anticipates a digital identity management that
is similar to physical identity management with plastic
cards stored in a wallet [35]. To this end, SSI typically
employs so-called verifiable credentials (VCs) that are
digital certificates, equivalent to physical credentials,
such as ID cards, stored in a user-specific digital
wallet [27]. They are cryptographically signed and
contain specific information (claims) about the identity
of a subject [36]. To increase privacy, VCs are often
combined with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). These
allow users to selectively disclose certain attributes of
their digital identity on a case-by-case basis [36].
The use of such VCs involves three different roles:
issuer, holder, and verifier. Issuers attest various claims
about an identity, organize these as VCs, and transfer
them to holders. Holders can then store VCs in a digital
wallet, which gives them exclusive and full control of
their VCs. A digital wallet is a software application
(e.g., a mobile app) dedicated to managing VCs. The
use of cryptographic keys ensures a level of security
that is superior to physical wallets [35]. Holders can
use their digital wallets and VCs to generate a verifiable
presentation (VP) that proofs certain claims about their
own identity to verifiers [31]. VPs can be derived
from one or multiple VCs and provide a tamper-resistant
presentation of identity attributes [36]. As VPs
are cryptographically secured, verifiers can verify the
integrity of the VP in solely bilateral interactions
with the holder. The prerequisite is, however, that
verifiers trust the issuer. To enhance trust, SSI is often
complemented with governance frameworks to enable
certification of issuers, ensure trustworthy processes,
and provide industry-specific standards for VCs [35].
From a technical perspective, SSI implementations
employ so-called decentralized identifiers (DIDs)
to exchange VCs. The DIDs typically use
verifiable data registries to store DIDs and refer to
DID documents [35]. The DID documents commonly
contain cryptographic information such as public keys
and metadata. These can be used to prove control
and establish secure communication channels with the
DID controller [37]. As the use of a single DID for
multiple connections may cause privacy risks, a set of
pairwise-pseudonymous DIDs for each relationship can
prevent such correlation [37]. These pairwise DIDs are
often not stored in the registry [35]. While the general
exchange of VCs does not require blockchain, it can
be used as a verifiable registry to store information on
accredited issuers or revocation of VCs [27, 34].
3. Research Method
To explore the role of blockchain and SSI for
decentralized eRoaming, we follow a DSR approach.
DSR is a suitable method for the design and
development of IT-based artifacts, such as constructs,
models, or instantiations to extend organizational
capabilities [21, 38]. Our artifact constitutes a
conceptual architecture for decentralized eRoaming.
Furthermore, we derive four design principles as the
first steps towards a nascent design theory [21]. As
successful DSR requires both rigor and relevance of
research, we strictly followed the suggested process
Page 4623
of Peffers et al. [18]. In doing so, we conducted a
SLR [19] to ensure the rigor of our research, support
our problem formulation, define the requirements and
objectives of our solution, and inform the design of our
artifact (process steps 1-3) [18,38]. We further presented
and evaluated our conceptual architecture in 13 expert
interviews (process steps 4+5) to ensure the relevance
of our research [18, 38].
To provide a rigorous foundation, we grounded
our work in literature by conducting a SLR [19].
For our SLR, we used the search string electric
vehicle AND charging AND roaming, and analyzed the
databases ACM Digital Library, AISEeL, IEEEXplore,
ScienceDirect, Scopus, and Web of Science. Our search
covered all full text and metadata analysis and resulted
in a total of 357 articles (including 34 duplicates).
We then conducted a three-stage screening process to
remove all articles that did not focus on eRoaming
or related sub-processes. After title (n-195), abstract
(n-73), and full-text (n-48) screening, our analysis
resulted in a subset of overall seven articles. A forward
and backward search lead to one additional article. We
also analyzed grey literature to incorporate practical
expertise [38]. Using ResearchGate, the Google Search
Engine, and reviewing websites of eRoaming initiatives,
we identified 11 supplementary documents.
To evaluate our artifact and ensure the relevance of
our research, we performed a qualitative evaluation [20].
As illustrated in Table 1, we conducted 13 interviews
with experts from the energy sector who focus on
eRoaming or decentralized energy systems. More
specifically, we conducted interviews with technical
as well as business-oriented experts from CPOs,
eMSPs, eRoaming providers, consultancies, and
research institutes to represent all relevant stakeholders.
In these interviews, we first discussed the current
status quo and challenges as well as requirements
related to eRoaming. This enabled us to validate
the identified design objectives and requirements.
Thereafter, we presented and reviewed our emerging
conceptual architecture for a decentralized eRoaming
system and gathered feedback. With the help of this
feedback, we continuously reviewed and refined our
conceptual architecture in iterative build-and-evaluate
loops [38]. We stopped scheduling new interviews
once we reached theoretical saturation from the as yet
limited practical experiences with SSI. All interviews
were conducted in a semi-structured way to limit
subjectivity and ensure flexibility as compared to
predefined questions [39]. To analyze our data, we
followed [40] and performed a two-stage process of
inductive and deductive coding. First, two authors
analyzed the data independently and assigned initial
codes to identify challenges, requirements, and potential
approaches to eRoaming. Thereafter, we assigned our
initial codes to higher-level concepts that we identified
in the literature (deductive coding) or emerged during
our analysis (inductive coding). In total, we codified
543 statements organized in four first-order themes (i.e.,
problem spaces, requirements, role of blockchain, and
role of SSI) and 17 second-order categories that match
the core concept presented in the remainder of this work.
Table 1. Interview partners.
ID Role (Organization) Experience
1 IT-Developer (CPO & eMSP) ≥ 4 years
2 Business Developer (P2P Energy Trading) ≥ 3 years
3 Team Leader Mobility (Consultancy) ≥ 3 years
4 Researcher (Research Institute) ≥ 3 years
5 Director E-Mob (BLC & Energy Foundation) ≥ 2 years
6 Consultant (IT-Consultancy) ≥ 10 years
7 IT-Consultant (CPO & eMSP) ≥ 10 years
8 Project Manager Mobility (Consultancy) ≥ 1 years
9 Head of Venture Creation (Consultancy) ≥ 2 years
10 Product Manager (eMSP & CPO) ≥ 3 years
11 Researcher (Research Institute) ≥ 2 years
12 Product Manager (eRoaming Start-up) ≥ 4 years
13 CTO (eRoaming Start-up) ≥ 3 years
4. Towards Decentralized eRoaming
4.1. Design Objectives and Requirements
We derived six design objectives as well as
18 matching design requirements from our literature
analysis, which were also confirmed by our experts
in terms of our evaluation. These objectives and
requirements provide the frame of our eRoaming
architecture.
DO1 – Disintermediation: EMCHs typically
rely on proprietary protocols. Due to network
effects and high switching costs, EMCHs often
have a monopolistic or oligopolistic position in the
eRoaming market [7, 8, 26], which allows them to
levy unduly high eRoaming fees. To mitigate
this concern, researchers and practitioners recommend
to avoid concentration of market power (R 1) by
developing eRoaming systems that are independent of
intermediaries (Experts 1, 5-7, 10-12).
DO2 – Accountability: To enable reliable
eRoaming, CPOs and eMSPs must be able to avoid
uncovered costs and potential fraud resulting from, for
instance, charging with an invalid contract. Thus,
every actor involved in a charging event must be
authenticated (R 2) [23, 24, 41]. CPOs can therefore
verify the validity of users’ contracts to ensure that
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they are permitted to charge on behalf of their eMSP.
In case of misuse, cancellation, or expiration, an
eMSP can revoke the permission and respective contract
(R 3) [11, 23, 24]. To protect both consumers and CPOs
or eMSP, reliable eRoaming also has to ensure that
charging events cannot be declared invalid retroactively.
This makes non-repudiation and data integrity (R 4) an
essential requirement [9, 24, 26, 41].
DO3 – Efficiency: For a reliable eRoaming
process, seamless information exchange between
involved entities is crucial. According to our experts,
B2B billing and payment processes are not yet fully
automated, which limits such a seamless exchange, and
increases eRoaming fees. Thus, end-to-end process
automation (R 5) is essential for seamless clearing
and overall cost reduction [8, 25]. To this end, a
standardized, machine-readable information exchange
between CPOs and eMSPs is essential (R 6) [8, 9, 25].
Moreover, a standardized ID schema (R 7) may also
simplify the verification of stakeholders [26]. A public
registry (R 8) can additionally provide information on
certified charging points, such as coordinates [22].
DO4 – Data Protection: As prior research
illustrates, insufficient protection of personal
information and the availability of geographic
information, may enable the creation of charging
or movement profiles [23, 24]. To prevent such privacy
infringement, eRoaming solutions should comply with
data protection regulations such as the GDPR or the
CCPA. Moreover, correlations of personally identifiable
and charging-related information beyond information
required for eRoaming should be avoided (R 9)
(Experts 1, 2, 4, 6 & 9). Specifically, information
on a charging event should be accessible only to
the user, and the corresponding eMSP for billing
purposes [24, 41]. Apart from user data, eRoaming
solutions should also protect sensitive business data of
CPOs or eMSPs [22, 26] (Experts 5, 9 & 10). Thus, the
confidentiality of sensitive data should be ensured (R 10)
and only authorized entities should be able to access
charging-related information. Data minimization
according to the need-to-know principle (R 11) can,
for instance, help CPOs and eMSPs to only receive
information that is directly relevant to authentication
and billing [23, 24, 41]. Moreover, eRoaming systems
should avoid centralized storage of data (R 12) to
prevent a single point of failure and reduce the risks of
data breaches [11].
DO5 – Usability: To enhance EV adoption,
eRoaming solutions should be easy to use and require
at most as many user interactions as traditional
charging systems (R 13). The interviewed experts
particularly emphasized the principle of one face to the
customer (R 14). That is, seamless eRoaming should
be possible using a single contract, app, or RFID
card. This also includes non-discriminatory pricing
and transparent communication of tariffs (R 15) [9,
22]. Moreover, eRoaming systems should be easy
to apply for CPOs and eMSPs and require no more
implementation effort than current solutions (R 16) [9,
26]. A certain flexibility of eRoaming solutions to
grant business model independence (R 17) may also help
innovation and adoption of eRoaming [9, 26].
DO6 – Scalability: Our Experts 1, 4 & 7 expect an
increase of EV adoption. Thus, eRoaming systems will
have to cope with an increasing number of users and
eRoaming activities. To meet the increasing demand,
decentralized eRoaming systems should also consider
their scalability to handle at least as many transactions
as centralized eRoaming systems (R 18) without outages
or long response times.
4.2. Conceptual Architecture
Building on the identified design objectives and
requirements, we developed a conceptual architecture
for decentralized eRoaming. As Figure 1 illustrates,
our eRoaming architecture involves three entities: the
CPO, the eMSP, and the user. The eRoaming
system builds on a public blockchain and SSI
for identity management, complemented by legacy
systems and secure communication via REST-APIs and
HTTPS (R 10). We employ HTTPS communication on a
B2B level for clearing and payment, as HTTPS provides
a well-established standard for server and client
authentication (R 16). However, the X.509 certificates
used in HTTPS do not support selective disclosure,
and consequently, enable correlation of data [36]. To
mitigate ensuing privacy concerns, our architecture
employs SSI and VCs on a business-to-customer (B2C)
level supported by ZKPs (R 9 - 11). To ensure the
authenticity and enable verifiability of VCs, the public
blockchain functions as a tamper-resistant verifiable
data registry, such as currently provided by Hyperledger
Aries and Indy. More specifically, Hyperledger Indy
comprises a public permissioned blockchain framework
mainly used for storing DIDs and corresponding DID
documents, publishing VC schemata and definitions,
and creating privacy-preserving revocation registries.
Hyperledger Aries provides an interface layer and
client-side tools for accessing data stored on the Indy
blockchain as well as issuing, verifying, and storing VCs
through an API.
For the use of SSI, users receive a digital wallet app
installed on a smartphone to authenticate at charging










































Figure 1. Conceptual architecture for decentralized eRoaming.
wallet generates a private holder binding (e.g., a
cryptographic link secret) to limit opportunities for
theft and intentional sharing of VCs. The wallet
acts as a client that can connect to the blockchain to
generate proofs of non-revocation or verify public issuer
information (R 2). In addition, the user can install a
mobile charging app that can be used for registration and
additional services provided by the eMSP.
eMSPs issue VCs that certify the contractual
relationship with users. For this purpose, eMSPs run
a cloud agent that makes use of the tools provided by
Hyperledger Aries. This cloud agent acts as a client
that can connect to the blockchain, allowing eMSPs
to publish issuer-related information such as DIDs and
DID documents. Moreover, eMSPs can create an entry
in the blockchain-based revocation registry to revoke
previously issued VCs (R 3). The cloud agent also
connects to a legacy system to handle the billing of
charging events. The legacy system includes a customer
relationship management (CRM) system, an accounting
service, a banking API, and a controller.
CPOs act as verifiers by connecting their backend
system with an Aries-based cloud agent to generate
proof requests and validate VCs. The CPO’s cloud agent
acts as a client and reads the blockchain-based registry
to verify the authenticity (signing key) and revocation
state of the presented VC (R 2). On the side of CPOs,
the legacy system includes a controller, a CRM system,
and an accounting service that is connected to a banking
API to check for the payment status of charging events.
The controller serves as the core module for managing
charging events and triggers all other components. In
the following, we will outline the eRoaming process.
To enable eRoaming, users must conclude an
eRoaming contract with an eMSP. Users can request
such a contract, for instance, via a charging app provided
by the eMSP. The eMSP’s charging app forwards the
contract request to the eMSP’s controller and triggers
a connection invitation. The controller sends the static
connection invitation including the eMSP’s public DID
to the charging app. A deeplink within the connection
invitation triggers the user’s wallet. The wallet receives
the invitation and resolves the DID and DID document
via the blockchain to determine the service endpoint
(cloud agent). The wallet transmits a newly generated
pairwise DID to the eMSP’s cloud agent and requests
a secure connection. The cloud agent generates a new
pairwise DID and establishes the connection (R 10).
The eMSP sends the contract in printed form or via
email and requests payment details from the user, who
manually signs the contract and provides the requested
information. To increase process automation, the
registration could also employ VCs to authenticate users
and transmit their payment detail (R 5).
Based on the provided information, the controller
triggers the cloud agent to issue an eRoaming-VC. The
cloud agent sends a VC offer to the user’s wallet. The
VC’s attributes include at least the user’s name, the
EMAID, and the contract expiration date. Furthermore,
the VC’s metadata contains issuer information. The
user verifies the offer and requests the VC. The wallet
transmits a blinded link secret (i.e., hash of link secret
including a random nonce) to the cloud agent to generate
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a private holder binding. Finally, the cloud agent issues
the VC, which is stored in the user’s wallet (R 12).
At the charging point, the user scans a static QR
code that is attached to the charging point. The QR
code includes a link containing the charging point’s ID,
initiating a proof request via the CPO’s controller. As
no secure connection between the user and CPO exists,
the CPO’s controller triggers the cloud agent to generate
a so-called connectionless proof request. Thereby,
additional steps such as the creation of pairwise DIDs
and key pairs can be avoided. The CPO’s cloud agent
generates the proof request and directs it to the user’s
wallet via the controller. The proof request specifies
that only credential definitions provided by a CPO’s
eRoaming partners are accepted (R 2). This ensures
that the CPO is allowed to provide charging services
on behalf of the eMSP. The wallet notifies the user
about the proof request and suggests a VP. Based on the
need-to-know principle, the required information may
differ. In case of a flat rate contract, a ZKP that the
customer has a non-revoked eRoaming-VC representing
a contract with a reliable eMSP would suffice (R 11).
To generate the ZKP, the wallet requests the revocation
state from the blockchain. In case the user does not
have a flat rate contract, the EMAID is additionally
required for user accountability. As soon as the user
confirms the VP, the wallet sends it together with a
proof of non-revocation to the CPO’s cloud agent. The
CPO’s cloud agent requests the revocation state from the
blockchain to verify the proof and forwards the proof
attributes to the controller, which stores the provided
information. Upon receiving the information, the
controller deletes the proof detail from the cloud agent
to ensure steady performance and to avoid redundant
storage of user data (R 12). The controller activates the
charging point after successful user authentication.
Following a charging event, the charging point
generates a CDR and sends it to the CPO’s controller,
which forwards it to the CPO’s accounting service. The
CPO’s accounting service then receives and reads the
CDR and requests the eMSP’s billing information from
the CPO’s CRM system. The CPO’s accounting service
generates the B2B billing document and sends it to
the eMSP’s controller together with the corresponding
CDR. This initiates the accounting process on the part
of the eMSP. The eMSP’s accounting service receives
the CDR and billing document from the controller and
verifies both. The accounting service then prompts
a bank transfer to the CPO. In parallel, the eMSP’s
accounting service requests the user’s payment detail
from the eMSP’s CRM system and generates the direct
debit. The accounting service executes the bank transfer
and commits the direct debit via the banking API.
5. Evaluation and Implications
We presented and evaluated our conceptual
architecture in 13 expert interviews. The experts
emphasized the user-friendliness of our framework,
and confirmed its overall feasibility. Our conceptual
architecture addresses many identified requirements
for decentralized eRoaming but cannot ensure R 15 as
the tariff-design may depend on the B2B eRoaming
agreements. Scalability (R 18) cannot be assessed
because we have not yet implemented our solution.
The same applies to the correlation of data (R 9),
which may not be entirely eliminated outside of a flat
rate agreement. We thus advocate for an additional
cryptographic mechanism (ZKPs) to enhance privacy.
In our interviews, we identified four generalizable
design principles. These design principles help to
determine the role of blockchain and guide practical
implementations of SSI-based eRoaming and the
presented architecture. Some design principles may also
be abstractable to other use cases.
DP1 – Don’t use blockchain for payment:
Blockchain-based clearing would require the
replacement of well-established accounting systems.
For CPOs and eMSPs, this replacement entails
substantial organizational overhead (R 16) and,
according to our experts, could also raise legal
concerns (Experts 1, 4, 5, 9 & 12). Expert 4 emphasized
potential organizational constraints of blockchain-based
payment – in particular for cases such as eRoaming
where accounting is often conducted asynchronously
on a monthly basis: “There is no need for writing
transactions retroactively on a blockchain. Instead,
one could use traditional APIs”. Legal concerns
primarily result from the use of cryptographic tokens
for accounting purposes. Expert 1, for instance, does
not “believe that blockchain will replace a traditional
accounting system’s functionality. On the contrary,
such accounting systems are often legally required.”
While the EU’s Markets in Crypto Assets directive may
reduce legal uncertainties regarding the use of tokens in
the future, their use poses legal uncertainties today [42].
Moreover, CPOs and eMSPs often lack the technical
capabilities for implementing blockchain-based
payment systems (Experts 1 & 4). The know-how
required to use blockchain, which according to
our experts has not yet reached a level of maturity
where it would be easy to understand and deploy,
may overwhelm CPOs and eMSPs (R 16). The use of
token-based payment is also ill-received from a usability
perspective (Experts 5, 9 & 12). Users, in particular, but
also legal entities such as CPOs or eMSPs often refuse
to accept private tokens or public cryptocurrencies,
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not least as they require the cumbersome exchange of
fiat currency into domain-specific tokens [10] (R 13).
According to Expert 12, “there are many projects that
offer stable coins. However, they all just don’t make
sense as they require two or three additional steps,
which reduces efficiency”.
DP2 – Don’t store sensitive data on-chain: Many
decentralized eRoaming systems lack standardized PKIs
for users [25]. According to Experts 5, 9 & 13, such
PKIs could be achieved through the combination
of VCs and blockchain technology. This would
enable public auditability independent of certificate
authorities [31]. While Expert 5 emphasizes the
need for a blockchain ”as trust anchor [so that]
certificates are unchangeable,” others fear that the use
of blockchain may jeopardize the competitiveness of
CPOs and eMSPs. Storing too much charging-related
information on-chain may make sensitive business
data publicly available and present unwanted privacy
challenges (Experts 5, 9 & 11) (R 10).
For users, privacy considerations are even more
critical. Since VCs are predominantly used to
identify natural persons, data privacy regulations,
such as the GDPR, require that personal data
can either be fully anonymized or even erased.
However, “this [erasure of personal data] is not
possible with blockchain” (Expert 13), which is
why storing identifiable information of natural
persons on-chain is difficult to reconcile with such
regulation (Expert 2, 4, 9, 11 & 13). Moreover,
tamper-resistant storage of VCs does not automatically
guarantee their authenticity. Verifiers would have
to validate the identity of a VC’s issuer. To
assess the integrity of such authorized issuers, it
would be advisable to use a public blockchain as a
verifiable registry for publishing essential and intently
public information (Expert 5, 11 & 13) (R 2). The
tamper-resistance of a blockchain thereby ensures the
integrity of issuer information and prevents fraud.
We considered this recommendation in our proposed
architecture and only used the public blockchain for
information on issuers and the revocation status of
VCs. For personal information in the form of VCs and
users’ cryptographic keys, we used digital wallets to
avoid conflicts with privacy expectations and regulation.
This enables the required off-chain storage of personal
information for SSI applications using blockchain [27].
DP3 – Don’t overuse VCs: Our proposed
architecture employs VCs for third-party verification
of contract information to facilitate reliable user
authentication. This entails VC-based information
exchange between users and CPOs, and users and
eMSPs. In addition, we also discussed the potentials
of VCs as user receipts after charging or for direct
communication between CPOs and eMSPs in our
interviews. While some experts see benefits in these
applications, opinions are divided. Experts 4, 5 & 9,
for instance, deem VCs for both user receipts and the
communication between CPOs and eMSPs redundant
as involved parties communicate directly and no
third-party verification is required: “I don’t see benefits
[for using a VC for B2B data exchange], because it’s
just data that could also be transferred directly. The
benefit of VCs is that they can be stored and repeatedly
presented to a verifier” (Expert 5). Other than being
redundant, the use of VCs for user receipts may even
be harmful to overall user-friendliness according to
our interviewed experts. Receiving a VC after every
transaction (e.g., charging event) would unnecessarily
clutter the wallets of users without any added value.
Instead, a consolidated monthly overview of charging
sessions via email or the eMSP’s charging app would
suffice (Expert 4 & 6) (R 14). “I think most end
users, they’re interested in the monthly statement at the
end. And then you could list the individual charging
processes in a PDF, if someone is interested” (Expert 4).
That is, VCs should primarily be used for
information that requires third-party verification and
frequent presentation. In other cases, especially where
direct communication between cooperating parties is
involved, conventional channels are better suited for the
transfer of information. Our experts would recommend
a digital signature and the commonly used HTTPS (R 4)
protocol for secure and tamper-resistant information
exchange (Expert 1 & 11). HTTPS is also less complex
than VCs (R 16) and users as well as eMSPs and CPOs
can rely on a more mature technology.
DP4 – Don’t exaggerate decentralization: In our
architecture, SSI components run in the CPOs’ backend
and on mobile apps of users’ mobile phones. We also
discussed options for installing SSI components directly
on hardware, for instance, EVs and charging points. Yet,
charging points often have only limited computational
functionalities, and CPOs typically connect their
charging points to a backend system (controller).
This enables the simultaneous operation of multiple
charging points and considerably reduces complexity
and costs. While blockchain and SSI are often
associated with a maximum of decentralization, our
experts would refrain from installing SSI components
on each individual hardware separately, such as charging
points (Experts 1, 4, 6 & 8-13). Instead, they argue for a
level-headed approach that does not trade functionality
and user-friendliness for maximal decentralization.
Many experts, however, believe that EV-based
SSI may enhance functionality and user-friendliness
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although it would also lead to more decentralization.
In this scenario, EVs, not users, would act as
holders of VCs. A similar approach has already
been suggested with the plug-and-charge ISO 15118
standard [23]. EVs would automatically present their
VCs to the charging point to initiate charging-related
transactions (Expert 2, 9, & 10). While such an approach
may appeal to users, it would require substantial
retrofitting of current EVs for car manufacturers to
comply with technical requirements of SSI. To enable
automatic charging, also charging points would have to
be adapted for the direct reception and verification of
VCs [25] (Expert 10 & 11).
To date, both car manufacturers and CPOs would
resent major and often unnecessary adjustments of their
hardware [34]. To retain the flexibility granted by
decentralization albeit avoiding high retrofitting costs
and potential fragmentation, Experts 3, 4, 6-8, 10 & 11
called for leveraging a single software-based SSI
implementation compatible with CPOs’ and eMSPs’
legacy systems and independent of EVs. The cloud
agent should accordingly be integrated into a CPO’s
backend system and user’s digital wallet in the form of
a mobile app, not to the charging point or EV itself.
This would considerably reduce implementation and
maintenance efforts and would benefit CPOs as it allows
for the use of a single cloud agent for multiple charging
points to further diminish fragmentation (R 16): “I think
it’s easier to implement it in the backend, as otherwise,
I would have to check the technical feasibility for each
charging point” (Expert 8).
6. Conclusion
eRoaming can improve access to charging
infrastructure. Yet, current systems are predominately
centralized and entail risks of market power
concentration [7, 9]. While decentralized solutions with
blockchain have been considered to mitigate such risks,
they come with significant privacy concerns [8, 11].
We, therefore, aim to provide an alternative approach
by investigating how a decentralized eRoaming systems
can be designed with blockchain and SSI. Using
DSR helped us to answer our research question by
developing a conceptual architecture for decentralized
eRoaming based on blockchain and SSI. In doing so,
we derive four generalizable design principles as a
theoretical contribution [21]. Our research provides a
more nuanced understanding of the roles of blockchain
and SSI for decentralized eRoaming and related service
models. Specifically, we identified that SSI can address
privacy-related problems of eRoaming. We also find
that blockchain can function as a public registry,
while it best leverages its benefits when it takes a
backseat for other applications. Our findings provide
practical guidance for roaming service architectures
based on blockchain and SSI. However, this research
is also subject to limitations. While the proposed
architecture employs a blockchain as a public verifiable
registry, traditional centralized databases might also
serve this function. In this context, further research is
necessary to assess the need and benefits of blockchain
for SSI applications [43]. Moreover, as this work
focuses on decentralized eRoaming, it provides limited
generalizability. For future research, we aim to extend
the scope of our analysis beyond eRoaming. In doing
so, we aim to derive a more generalizable design theory
for eRoaming and similar service models.
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